Liberation War of Bangladesh

The meeting on the Meghna was the first set-piece battle of the liberation war. It amply demonstrated enemy’s superiority in fire power and its ever whelming capability to move at ease by air and water. The enemy was better trained in modern warfare and in the handling of weapons. With the lack of mobility and fire power the two main deciding factors for any conventional warfare, no commander can ever conceive of an armed engagement. But the situation was different with the liberation army. We had to fight with what ever we had. We knew it for certain that today’s defeat would bring forth victory in the future. The first set-piece battle had its obvious toll in killed and injured. Subedar Sirajul Islam, Lance Naik Abdul Hai, sepoys Kafil Uddin and Abdur Rahman Sarkar and many others died in this action while a good number got injured.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

After a long hurried night march the troops got exhausted and tried. They were thirsty. Sarail gave them a rather cold welcome. The warmth and enthusiasm of the locals on the previous day diminished to its lowest ebb. We could appreciate the feeling of the people. They had reposed high hopes on us. We failed them and could not come up to their expectation at Ashuganj.
Another eight miles to Shahbazpur, on the banks of Titas. I was there with my troops less the company under Matin. By the second half of the night Matin reached Shahbazpur. Bhairab could not be held for long. Matiur was overpowered. The use of the bridge and the river Meghna to get across to our side of the bank was denied to him. Matiur withdrew to the north along the railway track to Kuliarchar. He joined me later through Chatalpar.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Nasim and Morshed sustained injuries during this action which had an adverse effect on the battle. Now with the successful heli landing of the enemy I thought it better to get my troops extricated to safety. They were already disorganized and were in utter confusion. Towards the evening Nasim fell back towards Sarail. The enemy flotilla turned on the mouth of Titas, landed their troops and began to sweep along my left flank. Matin at Lalpur began to feel uneasy. The position was no more tenable by him. It was evening when he fell back along the railway track and there from to Brahmanbaria. Brahmanbaria wore a deserted look. It was about midnight when, Matin along with his troops made for Sarail without any delay and found none of our troops there also.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

The Ajabpur position was thinly held by irregular troops under a junior commissioned officer. The heli landings took place around that place unhindered. The enemy air strikes continued to dominate the battle field. My troops simply ducked down in their trenches. Their power of movement and initiative was snatched away. The heliborne troops soon organized themselves quietly and attacked our position at Ashuganj from the north-east of the railway track. To counter this unforeseen development, that is, the landing of the heliborne troops at the rear, Nasim quickly reorganized his company inspite of air action and assaulted the enemy. Lance Naik Abdul Hai, the detachment commander of an MG post, kept on firing on the enemy from an open trench on the railway track till he was hit by a direct shot from 83 mm blendicide causing his instantaneous death. The enemy closed in our defended localities in a body. Soon they were drawn in unawares within our fold. Close quarter battle that continued for about an hour had witnessed some of the fiercest hand to hand fights. The enemy suffered a good number on casualties in this encounter.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

As the battle raged on the enemy bank, the flotilla closed in within range and formed a perfect target. The commander at Lalpur, Matin, in his hurried and difficult move the previous night had left his 106 mm RR with the company at Ashuganj under Nasim. The RR could not be moved because of carriage difficulties. However, one 75 mm RR was moved from Gokanaghat to the mouth of Titas which scored 5 shots at the LCT without causing any material damage.
When the flotilla was still looking for our position with searching eyes, a trigger happy soldier from the middle opened fire. The enemy returned immediately with a volley from the tanks. Instantly all the fire opened up. Our rocket launchers and mortars started pounding the enemy. The enemy was taken aback. The flotilla gradually started drifting away from the bank while the guns kept on spitting fire. In no time, six Sabre F-86 fighters were on our positions at Bhairab, Ashuganj, Lalpur and at Brahmanbaria. They were playing havoc and kept us pinned down. Air action left my troops in a spell of chaos and confusion. This continued uninterrupted for 6 hours from 5-30 a.m. to 11-30 a.m. it was during this time that I noticed a beeline of MI-8 helicopters yonder across the river to Shohagpur between Ashuganj and Ajabpur. The helicopters squatted for a while to unload the Pakistani “Maroon Barets” and flew back to fly in more sorties. It was a company plus that landed behind our position. I had no anti-heli force to counter this dangerous threat behind my back. Thus, to our great disadvantage, another dimension was added to this battle, where we could not help much.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

At 5-30 a.m. on April 15, enemy guns opened up on our positions at Ashuganj, Lalpur and Bhairab. It was evident that pre-H hour bombardment had started. I guessed, it was from the vicinity of Khana Bari railway station that the guns were firing. The enemy flotilla again appeared in front of Lalpur. Heavy bombardment continued which kept our heads done. My troops at Lalpur under the command of Matin caught sight of the enemy advancing cautiously over the Meghna. The enemy was heading towards Lalpur for a landing under the cover of their artillery fire. It was virtually a flotilla that carried the enemy on board, approximately a battalion plus strength. The fleet consisted of two gunboats, two landing craft tanks and four launches. Troops of chafe’s PT 76 with their upright hulls were ominously lurking at Lalpur. I must congratulate my boys for exercising extreme restrain and control on fire. With their eyes on the enemy and fingers on the trigger, they were measuring up the range.
In the meantime another enemy battalion stole on Bhairab Bazar along the railway track. I had no means to influence the battle across the river. Matiur was instructed to contain and to impose maximum delay on the enemy and ultimately fallback on the home bank over the bridge and by boat.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

However, on reaching Lalpur Matin hurriedly positioned himself on the left of Morshed’s position. As he moved along river bank he had to leave behind his recoilless rifles at Ashuganj with Nasim because of transportation difficulties. Morshed remained deployed at Lalpur on the right side of Matin’s company. It remained a mistry to me why this company from Sharail was moved to Lalpur on foot via Ashuganj rather than sending them on vehicle via Brahmanbaria.
On hearing about this impending enemy landing, at 2 a.m. on April 15, I left Moulvi Bazar and reached Brahmanbaria at dawn. I was surprised to learn that my reserve company was already moved from Sharail to Lalpur by Lt. Col. Reza. Lalpur tactically was an important place no doubt. It dominated the mouth on Titas and the track running due south-east of Brahmanbaria. For this purpose I deployed Morshed there. But to me depth at that time was more important under the circumstances, than linear deployment of all the available troops on the river bank. Beaching operation, though an extremely difficult one, but is never a failure. A determined enemy could always make a landing on the enemy shore, and successfully make a bridge head. We could stop him only after the landing and fight him from successive intermediate positions. But my intermediate position remained unoccupied.
I had no wireless communication with the companies. The use of a foot runner was time consuming. The battle was gaining momentum. Recalling of the reserve company at this hour was nighters neither possible nor logical particularly when we were under constant enemy air attack. I took the bitter pill and only hoped for the best.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Early in the morning of April 14, the enemy with a fleet of river craft probed the bank of river Meghna near Lalpur for a landing. To our appreciation the enemy was carrying out a reconnaissance of the landing place.
It was evident that the enemy was not able to make up their mind about the landing. They were yet not clear about or defensive layout and was, therefore, going slow about the landing. Suddenly the enemy came under intense fire from Lalpur. Exchange of fire continued for about an hour and the enemy pulled back downstream to the south. Lt. Col. Reza was at Brahmanbaria for shifting the currency from the banks and for depositing the same of Bangladesh Government at Agartala. Apprehending the threat confronting Lalpur, Lt. Col. Reza ordered the reserve company of Matin at Sharail to move to Lalpur. But for them my orders were different. On such situation they were to get deployed on the intermediary position between Talshahar and Gokanaghat line. This company in advance had recommoitered and prepared these positions. In my absence, however, Matin was given a different task and in order to accomplish that task he moved to the new location during the night along the eastern bank of river Meghna. As a result, he was not in a position to deploy his troops at Lalpur during the night, the reason being the position was neither reconnoitered nor prepared by him.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Matiur at Bhairab was not at all in a happy situation. He had a difficult withdrawal from Panchdone and Narshingdi. The enemy had followed him closely behind. Though the Rampur railway bridge was demolished it would need only a few hours efforts to establish a bridge head at Rampur and about 8 hours for assault crossing. I had to send a reinforcement there without any delay. A draft of young, hurriedly trained civilian volunteers arrived at Brahmanbaria in the morning on April 13. I ordered them to be dispatched immediately to Bhairab Bazar. This draft of young boys was from among the first batch of trainees received from Teliapara. As they were about to leave for Bhairab they came under heavy enemy strafing near the railway station. In this sudden air strike sepoy Mohammad Mohsin of East Bengal Regiment and a trained volunteer got killed. It was definitely a demoralizing effect on my troops. I was there to see them off to Bhairab.
On this day I got a message from Colonel Osmany to attend a co-ordination conference to be held at Moulvi Bazar at 10 a.m. on April 14. I therefore, left my headquarter for Moulvi Bazar on the morning of 14 April.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

. Another mixed regular company under Captain Ainuddin was deployed at Brahmanbaria facing Gokanaghat on the river Tista. One company of EPR troops under Captain Matin was located at Sharail. The main purpose of keeping this company at Sharail was to use them as reserve and also provide depth to the forward localities by occupying Talshahar and Gokanaghat line of defense. This line of defense was the only intermediary position between Ashuganj and Brahmanbaria. The company was kept mobile so that it can move fast and occupy Talshahar-Gokanaghat line of defense without much loss of time with a view to forestalling any threat developing on Ashuganj front.
Of late, the enemy reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters were active on our area. The purpose of these reconnaissance missions was known to us. We were, therefore, very particular about our camouflage and passive air defense.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

In April most of the river banks in Bangladesh stand out above the receding water level. At places the banks are steep and non-negotiable by transport without the help of a barge. At Ashuganj side of Meghna, although large scale landing facility did not exist, infantry movement was not at all difficult. Ashuganj is a railway station on the home side of the bridge. It is on a slightly raised ground. I decided to hold it physically with a company of regulars under Captain Nasim. About 3 miles to the north of Ashuganj, Ajabpur is a river ghat which serves Sharail and Brahmanbaria. An irregular company was deployed there under a junior commissioned officer. About 2 miles to the south of Ashuganj Lieutenant Morshed had a mixed regular and irregular company deployed thinly at Lalpur. Lalpur and Brahmanbaria were linked with an unmetalled road. Morshed’s task was to deny enemy landing within his area of responsibility and deny the use of unmetalled road by the enemy leading towards Brahmanbaria. Captain Matiur Rahman after fighting his way down from Narshingdi was deployed at Bhairab Bazar. He had an EPR company

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Meeting on the Meghna:
Pakistanis had a serious headache about Brahmanbaria, a place of vital importance between Sylhet and Comilla. As a river route to Sylhet, Bhairab-Ashuganj complex enjoyed tactical as well as strategic importance. Khaled on the south and my troops on the north, from either side, we had Brahmanbaria and Ashuganj-Bhairab respectively within our fold. Pakistanis decided to effect a break through. With a part of 53 Bridge-located at Comilla, Brigadier Iqbal Shafi had already made a dash over to Chittagong to take on Zia. This bridge finally moved to Chittagong duly replaced by 117 Brigades ex-9 iInfantry Division. Pakistanis wanted to have uninterrupted control over Sylhet-Comilla highway so that 313 and 117 Brigades could have free hand on the use of the highway. It was, therefore, quite obvious that a break through operation would be launched from Dhaka and that I would be required to receive the enemy at Bhairab-Ashuganj.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

In this spirited and patriotic address, he eulogized the liberation army, which was being formed around the nucleus of the professional soldiers from the East Bengal Regiment. While surveying the activities of the liberation army with additional information he further expanded the command structure, dividing the country into seven major regions and appointed the commanders for each region and those were:
a. Chittagong-Chittagong Hill Tracts region under Major Ziaur Rahman.
b. Comilla-Noakhali region under Major Khaled Musharraf.
c. Sylhet-Brahmanbaria-Mymensingh region under Major K.M. Safiullah.
d. Rangpur-region under Captain Nawazish.
e. Dinajpur-Rajshahi-Pabna region under Major Najmul Haque.
f. South west region (Khustia-Jessore) under Major Abu Osman Chowdhury.
g. Barishal-Patuakhali region under Capt. Jalil.
As predicted Colonel M A G Osmany was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the liberation force of Bangladesh. The announcement was most opportune. It had its desired effect.
Zia, Khaled and myself made our Plan to mop up pockets of resistance in our area preparatory to a combined onslaught on Dhaka. But our plans could not be materialized immediately. Enemy struck us at all fronts. Pakistani forces were hell bent on ousting us from the liberated areas.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Turning Point
The Liberation war up till now was lacking in the life force for want of a political back up. Obedience to a legal and constitutional authority is the basis for the healthy functioning of any military force. The vacuum created by the absence of a formally constituted government of Bangladesh was keenly felt be the rank and file of the liberation army. Thus thousands, amidst thunderous cheers, witnessed the birth of a new state-Bangladesh, in a border village, later christened as Mujib Nagar, in the subdivision of Chuadanga. This was officially proclaimed at an impressive oath taking ceremony which took place at Mujib Nagar on April 17. This ceremony was attended by over 50 foreign journalists and thousands of spectators.
After having formed the provisional government in exile at Agartala on April 10, the prime Minister designate, Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed, made his first radio broadcast through Shwadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (voice of free Bangladesh radio) announcing the formation of military command structure of ‘Mukti Bahini’, in which Colonel (later General) Osmany was made the Commander-in-Chief and named Safiullah, Zia, Khaled and Abu Osman as region commanders. On 11 April 71, Mr. Tajuddin Ahmed made his second radio broadcast again through Shwadhin Bangla Betar Kendra and called upon the people of Bangladesh to mobilize their energy for the liberation struggle.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Aziz organized strong defense on Sherpur-Shadipur line having a screen position on the far bank. He appreciated that the enemy, being strong, would chase him now. On April 23 an enemy aircraft flew over his area several times and after being sure about the target, began strafing and rocketing. This was followed by long range artillery fire on his position. The screen position was contacted by the enemy infantry on April 26. With heavy casualties the screen fell back but the enemy could not dislodge Aziz from the main defense.
In this action Havildar Muslemuddin and Lance Naik Abdur Rahman died and five were injured. The enemy also sustained heavy casualties, both in dead and injured. This debacle was first of its kind. We lost a vast tract of the liberated area in Sylhet. This was a major setback. In retrospect, while analyzing this action, I could not blame my men. They were inferior both in strength and in weapons to the enemy. We were too scattered to give a fight in an organized manner. Three-fourth of our troops was not trained to fight conventional set piece battle. We could master very little support from the locals to execute the plan. Lastly. The field commanders on our side lacked experience in the use of ground and weapons.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

It was then that the most inevitable had happened. Aziz was informed that the RR detachment on the right flank had abandoned the gun position. Without any delay he rushed there and found his silent recoilless rifle standing unmanned. It was mounted on jeep where the driver was also missing. Aziz got himself behind the steering wheel and as he started moving back to his command post, enemy tried a direct hit on the jeep. The jeep rolled down along the slope of the river and stopped half way. Luckily no damage was done. Aziz began to drive back. It was here that he found some of his men from the right flank running in panic. They said that enemy a platoon strong had crossed the river and landed at Kadamtali. Aziz was unable to get his men back to their position. As he reached his command post, news of a similar crossing on his western flank had also reached him. It was now clear to him that he was on the verge of being encircled by the enemy. The apprehension of Limayya was coming true. If only Aziz could appreciate in time the situation could have been different. However he could not help it. He did not have enough troops.
By evening he had to fall back to Lala Bazar where he collected all his men before finally falling back on Sherpur-Shakipur line.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

In the thick of the battle, Dutta came along with Lieutenant Colonel Limayya, an India army officer. It was rather unexpected and risky for an Indian officer to be there then. However, in reply to a question from Lamayya, Aziz told him that he could not make any arrangement to protect his flanks against any possible enemy crossing. Limayya asked him how long would you be able to hold on to this position, Aziz Like spirited soldier informed him that he would be able to hold on to his position as long as it is required. Soon Dutta and Limayya left the battle field.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

Aziz deployed his LMG on the southern end of the Kim’s bridge. The enemy, after about 4 hours of fight, was able to occupy the town and stopped short of the bridge. Constant shelling by artillery and mortar and fire from the automatics continued to engage our troops on the southern bank. In the mooning, enemy killed our LMG man on the bridge. Aziz himself got behind ghee unmanned LMG and continued firing on the enemy. All this time the enemy gave no indication of making any effort to get across the river. Aziz had deployed his 75 mm RR detachment on his right flank. This detachment became the main target of the enemy. About 2 p.m. two enemy Sabre jets flew over our position and started strafing. Our regular troops had fair idea of field defense. So enemy strafing could not do much harm to them.

Liberation War of Bangladesh

On the same evening Aziz moved in and deployed his troops in the town. He deployed a company of EPR at Ksadimnagar and manned Ambar Khana and wireless station with 60 volunteers under one Mujahid Captain. Khadimnagar experienced a hand to hand fight that night. Similarly enemy contacted our troops at Ambar Khana and wireless stations also. A heavy fighting continued the whole night. The regular company was deployed on the southern bank of Surma with a screen position on the northern bank. Aziz was badly short of manpower. The EPR troops tricking down from Sunamganj were not yet fully in. So they could not be counted in his battle strength. The battle gained momentum at about 3 a.m. in the morning. Our troops in the town started falling back almost in a route and the enemy was behind them. Enemy artillery started pounding us on the southern bank also.