However, on reaching Lalpur Matin hurriedly positioned himself on the left of Morshed’s position. As he moved along river bank he had to leave behind his recoilless rifles at Ashuganj with Nasim because of transportation difficulties. Morshed remained deployed at Lalpur on the right side of Matin’s company. It remained a mistry to me why this company from Sharail was moved to Lalpur on foot via Ashuganj rather than sending them on vehicle via Brahmanbaria.
On hearing about this impending enemy landing, at 2 a.m. on April 15, I left Moulvi Bazar and reached Brahmanbaria at dawn. I was surprised to learn that my reserve company was already moved from Sharail to Lalpur by Lt. Col. Reza. Lalpur tactically was an important place no doubt. It dominated the mouth on Titas and the track running due south-east of Brahmanbaria. For this purpose I deployed Morshed there. But to me depth at that time was more important under the circumstances, than linear deployment of all the available troops on the river bank. Beaching operation, though an extremely difficult one, but is never a failure. A determined enemy could always make a landing on the enemy shore, and successfully make a bridge head. We could stop him only after the landing and fight him from successive intermediate positions. But my intermediate position remained unoccupied.
I had no wireless communication with the companies. The use of a foot runner was time consuming. The battle was gaining momentum. Recalling of the reserve company at this hour was nighters neither possible nor logical particularly when we were under constant enemy air attack. I took the bitter pill and only hoped for the best.
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